occur both in people without mental disturbances, and also as a consequence of many different pathologies, including tinnitus and Parkinson's disease and other neuropsychiatric disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder. This conclusion is consistent with a Research Domain Criteria (RDoc) approach to psychiatric nosology, as hallucinations are evidently trans-diagnostic with respect to the categorical diagnosis of schizophrenia or psychosis. What does this mean for animal models of hallucinations and, more indirectly, for understanding neurobiological mechanisms underlying hallucinations? Is the task of modeling hallucinatory behavior in animals any more revealing or useful than it was some 50 years ago when there was a major drive to understand the effects of hallucinogenic drugs acting at serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine, 5-HT) receptors, such as LSD 2 ? This commentary will endeavor to address these issues in the context of recent neuroscientific advances.
Most definitions of hallucinations generally stress the uncoupling of subjective responses to external input. Such dissociations, which imply a loss of stimulus control or attention to input, are complementary in some ways to those of other disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, where there is a loss of experienced response control, or attention to output. The obvious fact that hallucinations in humans are generally defined in terms of subjective verbal report immediately appears to impose difficulties for animal studies, as also for other disorders such as depression. However, to adopt a sceptical stance, the inference of hallucinations in humans often itself depends on less than reliable subjective reports rather than directly measurable overt behavior, whereas it is often possible to infer some correlate of subjective processing in experimental animals from their overt behavior. In other words, it may be feasible to bridge what initially seems to be an impossibly wide gap between animal and human sensory experience, especially if a neuroscientific approach is adopted to make functional links via the strategy of triangulation of common mechanisms.
Changes in overt behavior in animals in the apparent absence of changes in sensory input are not in general sufficiently convincing as evidence of hallucinations because the behavior could simply be generated spontaneously. For example, limb flicks in cats 3 or head twitches 4 or startle in rodents 5 or checking behaviors in monkeys 6 caused by drugs such as 5-HT2A or dopamine receptor agonists could simply arise from forms of motor disinhibition in descending output pathways. The fact that such simple behaviors are produced by drugs known to be hallucinogenic in humans and are predictive of hallucinogenic potency in humans is certainly relevant, although given that 5-HT receptors are so widely dispersed in brain regions specialised for sensory, associative and motor functions, makes the correlations less compelling.
But the occurrence of entire, coherent sequences of apparently goal-directed behavior occurring in the absence of sensory support or the goal itself makes the inference of hallucination much more convincing. For example, the influential model of amphetamine psychosis arising from chronic administration of amphetamine produces not only repetitive stereotyped movements and a progressive fragmentation of behavior, in rats 7 , cats 8 and nonhuman primates 9 but some examples of monkeys apparently attending to imaginary stimuli in space, retrieving the stimuli with a grasp, and then bringing the 'object' to the mouth and chewing them 7 . This would appear to be an excellent example of a behavioral 'hallucination' and the literature has many other dramatic examples 9 . However, these demonstrations, impressive and fascinating as they are, have perhaps limited significance for drug discovery probably depend on many uncontrolled aspects of the animal's environment and previous experience and hence are not easily reproducible.
How can we make use of a more explicitly neuroscientific approach to improve our attempts to model hallucinations, especially in the wake of the exciting tools we have in the form of The main limitation of such approaches may be in terms of homology of the relevant neural structures across species, especially given the obvious species differences in sensory capacity as a function of modality -this may be a strong argument for the use of non-human primates, better to facilitate investigations of aberrant visual and auditory processing. At a systems level, some hypotheses concerning hallucinations depend on failure of monitoring by which sensory stimulation is not adequately modulated by back-projections of the prefrontal cortex to achieve effective corollary discharge 14 . This type of theory clearly requires recording neuronal activity simultaneously across defined neural networks using multi-electrode assemblies in order to define the hypothesized disconnection syndromes. The necessary triangulation with human findings could be further provided by magnetic resonance neuroimaging in both species (and magnetoencephalography in humans), combined with magnetic resonance spectroscopy to measure cross-species e.g. GABA/glutamate ratios.
Some of the most powerful evidence in humans has been to show that subjective verbal reports of auditory hallucinations in the absence of external stimulation nevertheless can be accompanied by activations in primary and language areas of auditory cortex 15 . This demonstration of 'false memory' shows that it may be possible to evoke internal neuronal activity that is then interpreted by the individual as real perceptual phenomena.
What may emerge from this neurobiological analysis, combined with novel theoretical approaches in neuropsychology and computational neuroscience, is a new way of classifying hallucinations that will enable commonalities across diagnostic categories and possible differences to be more readily identified. It seems likely that hallucinations can potentially arise from a variety of underlying causes and mechanisms and a first step would be to assess this possibility in a variety of models of schizophrenia (and perhaps other disorders) and determine how this maps onto possible clinical heterogeneity. If the RDoc approach is ultimately to be useful in psychiatry, in my view it will have to be able to advance novel mechanistic accounts of psychiatric symptoms such as hallucinations, and show how they can be manifested and treated effectively across a range of pathologies.
